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Abstract
This chapter maps the complex intersection between concepts of Islam and the
Muslim and counterterrorism law and policy. Faith is no longer weaponized only
by violent terrorist groups. States too have realized that Islam can be deployed
under a security banner in a variety of ideological and practical ways. At the
same time, a fractious wave of right-of-center populism has crashed over
northern Europe and the United States with demands for newly restrictive rules
for the citizenship and migration of Muslims. As a result, Islamic identity and
practice now play three distinct roles in counterterrorism law and policy—as
proxy for risk, object for reform, and object of extirpation. The result of these
trends is a sharp rise in formal and informal contestation over the nature and
legitimacy of Islam as a religious identity .
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Introduction
What role should religious identity, practice, and dogma play in security-related policies
and laws trained upon organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda? Today, this
question is centrally about Islamic dogma and the identity-related practices of those perceived to
be Muslim. It is also as contested today as it was more than a decade and a half ago, when al
Qaeda burst onto the global geopolitical stage. Today, faith is no longer weaponized by violent
terrorist groups alone. States too have realized that Islam can be deployed under a security banner
in a variety of ideological and practical ways. At the same time, a fractious wave of right-ofcenter populism has crashed over northern Europe and the United States with demands for newly
restrictive rules for the citizenship and migration of Muslims.1 The result of these trends is
continued, sharp contestation over the uses of Islam in counterterrorism and coterminous policy
fields.
At one point in time, the normative and human rights implications of religion’s
intersection with national security turned on the narrow question of whether religious identity
could lawfully be used as an effective criterion for investigation or coercive action. Now,
religious identity and practice play more complex and ambiguous roles across a range of both
‘hard’ coercive actions and also ‘soft,’ more regulatory counterterrorism interventions. Islam is
no longer solely a signal and proxy of risk, but also an object for reform or an object for
extirpation. At security policy’s periphery, pejorative conceptions of Islam exercise a
gravitational pull on contiguous policy domains such as immigration, a pull amplified by partisan
mobilizations and exogenous shocks such as the financial recession and the Syrian refugee crisis.
As Didier Bigo perceptively framed the matter more than a decade ago, those contiguous policy
domains have become thoroughly “securitized.”2
My aim in this chapter is to map the intersection between concepts of Islam and the
Muslim and counterterrorism law and policy. This intersection is increasingly complex, and a
narrow focus on religious discrimination as reflected by religious profiling is no longer apposite..
To be sure, larger strategic and partisan trends have sustained and expanded religious profiling.

But they have also motivated novel mobilization of ideas about Islam and Muslims in the
service of security-related policies By illustrating three distinct ways in which Islamic identity
and practice now do work in counterterrorism law and policy—as proxy for risk, object for
reform, and object of extirpation—I hope to clear space for new legal and normative inquiries.
These underscore the value of considering dynamic, political effects from the parallel phenomena
of regulation by faith and regulation of faith.
Why are Muslims Still the Problem?
In the immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks on the eastern American seaboard, the
2004 attack on Madrid’s Atocha station, and the 2005 London attacks, security policymakers in
affected jurisdictions faced a situation of uncertainty rather than risk. They did not know who was
a security risk. Nor did they know the magnitude of the aggregate risk. Given al Qaeda’s putative
1

Yılmaz F, ‘Right-Wing Hegemony and Immigration: How the Populist Far-Right Achieved Hegemony through the
Immigration Debate in Europe’ (2012) 60 Current Sociology 368. The magnitude of new restrictions on immigration
varies widely, and at least until now, marginal changes to immigration policy have been small. Akkerman T,
‘Immigration Policy and Electoral Competition in Western Europe A Fine-Grained Analysis of Party Positions over the
Past Two Decades’ (2015) 21 Party Politics 54
2
Bigo D, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’ (2002) 27 Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political 63.
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inspiration in Islamic doctrine, it was disappointing, although not especially surprising, that a first
generation of investigative and preventive measures used Muslim identity as a predicate for
investigation.
But time passed. New attacks did not proliferate after 2001. The notion that sleeper cells
were strewn willy-nilly across the Ruhr or the Midwestern rustbelt seemed increasingly the stuff
of lurid cinematic fantasy. As the sociologist Charles Kurzman keenly observed, increasingly the
question being prompted by (non-)events was why al Qaeda’s investment in visually spectacular
terrorism had failed to generate recruiting dividends.3 Where, Kurzman asked, were the “missing”
martyrs Osama bin Laden had hoped to inspire? To be sure, few asked that question.
Nevertheless, the terrifying uncertainty of an unknown unknown receded into a merely known
unknown. Terrorism was on its way to becoming just another species of risk to be calibrated and
managed. As a result, the felt need for broad, prophylactic criteria of suspicion may have
somewhat ebbed—at least until the IS arrived in 2014.
Nevertheless, post-2001 contestation over religion as criterion and concept in
counterterrorism law and policy never quite abated in either the United States or Europe. To the
contrary, categorical denunciation of Muslims as security risks have ebbed and flowed in political
campaigns throughout this period. At the policy level, no legal or policy resolution was reached
on whether religious identity could be used as a proxy for terrorism risk. And as this chapter
demonstrates, the range of ways in which Islamic concepts and criteria were deployed in
counterterrorism law and policy only expanded over time through a process of accretion and
incremental policy change.
I see two larger dynamics at work behind the stubborn persistence of Islam’s contested
status in the counterterrorism sphere. First, violent Islamist groups have long mobilized a claim to
shared religious identity, embedded in putative postcolonial heritages, as a ground of affiliation
with potential recruits in Europe and America. This is reflected in the geographic location of the
evolving threat. In the immediate wake of the 2001 attacks, al Qaeda was based around the
Durand Line of 1893, separating Afghanistan from Pakistan and marking the farthest extent of
nineteenth century British colonial power. In al Qaeda’s own accounts of its turn toward the ‘far
enemy’ of America, anticolonial tropes in Islamist garb also play a considerable role.4 Similarly,
the rapid rise of IS has refocused attention onto a zone centering on the 1916 Skyes-Picot line,
and extending into Syria, Iraq, and Turkey.5 The IS has celebrated its repudiation of that 1916
postcolonial dispensation, again as a means of signaling a distinctively anticolonial Islamic
political identity.
To encourage the flow of recruits from Europe and elsewhere, the IS has used an
aggressive social media strategy that tries to forge affinities of identity among potential
supporters and recruiters.6 The idea of a religious identity, albeit one that trades on anticolonial
3

Kurzman C, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (1 edition, Oxford University Press
2011).
4
Gerges FA, ‘The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global’ (Foreign Affairs, 28 January 2009)
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2005-11-01/far-enemy-why-jihad-went-global> accessed 13
September 2016
5
Cockburn P, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (New York, Verso Books 2015).
6
Weimann G, ‘The Emerging Role of Social Media in the Recruitment of Foreign Fighters’ in Andrea de Guttry,
Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (TMC Asser
Press 2016) <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_6> accessed 13 September 2016; Ingram
HJ, ‘The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations’ (2015) 69 Australian Journal of International Affairs
729; Farwell JP, ‘The Media Strategy of ISIS’ (2014) 56 Survival 49. In a single week in April 2015, the Islamic State
week IS put out 123 different media releases—one average 18 per day. Zelin AY, ‘Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A
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motifs and resentments, threads through IS propaganda. Hence, a significant number of IS
communications twin an agenda of doctrinal purity with the organization’s claim to be a
successor of the caliphate abolished by the Kemelist regime on March 3, 1924.7 It is not possible
to demonstrate with precision whether, or to what extent, this claim to anticolonial religious
affiliation is successful. But there is some reason to think it has struck a chord that al Qaeda’s
propaganda operation never touched. One study estimates that roughly 30,000 foreign fighters
entered Syria and Iraq to fight alongside IS between 2011 and 2015. 8 The extent and
sophistication of IS propaganda has, at a minimum, engendered a perception that a new
ideological front has opened in counterterrorism. In this new context, Islam operates as a shared
basis of identity, albeit one grounded in historical anticolonial struggles, and one that seems to
have some appeal for disenfranchised minority communities in former colonial states.
A second dynamic emerges over a longer time-frame as counterterrorism policy adapted
to the strategic deployment of a historicized Islam as a basis for mobilization and recruitment.
The September 2001 attacks precipitated dramatic institutional and legal shifts in the
counterterrorism policy and practice of the United States, European states, the European Union,
and the United Nations.9 In this first post-2001 iteration, counterterrorism policy was rarely
framed explicitly in terms of Islamic concepts and categories. But faith still operated sub rosa as
a basis for investigation and coercion, albeit often not in explicit terms. A central legal and
normative question raised by new legal authorities of detention, surveillance, and restraint was
therefore whether such powers were appropriately deployed predominantly against individuals
perceived to be Muslim.10
A decade later, the incidence of Islamic concepts and the use of Islam as a criterion has
proliferated far beyond questions of profiling. To a large extent, this has been driven by concerns
about the inefficacy of ‘hard’ state power against domestic recruitment by IS and al Qaeda.
Starting with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, a number of European states, the
European Union, and the United States have adopted alternative, ‘soft’ policies of ‘counterradicalization.’11
Counter-radicalization policies are united by the aim of influencing the doxa and practice
of Muslims. But they still take many forms, including selective support for certain religious
groups; state regulation of religious practice and imams; and the suppression of sects perceived as
Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output’ (2015) 9 Perspectives on Terrorism
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445> accessed 13 September 2016
7
Zelin 2016; Kennedy H, The Caliphate (London, Pelican 2016).
8
Bakker E and Singleton M, ‘Foreign Fighters in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of a Rapidly
Growing Phenomenon’ in Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds), Foreign Fighters
under International Law and Beyond (TMC Asser Press 2016) <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265099-2_2> accessed 13 September 2016. For a more contextual study of the flow of fighters from a single Danish city
(Aarhus), see Lindekilde L, Bertelsen P and Stohl M, ‘Who Goes, Why, and With What Effects: The Problem of
Foreign Fighters from Europe’ (2016) 27 Small Wars & Insurgencies 858
9
Many other countries also altered their security-related legal regimes after 2001, partially in response to United
Nations Security Council resolutions seeking changes. Scheppele KL, ‘Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response
to September 11’ (2004) 50 Loyola Law Review 89.
10
Harcourt B, Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: ‘Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counter-terrorism Measure and Does it
Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination,’ in Goold BJ and Lazarus L (eds), Security and Human Rights
(London, Bloomsbury Publishing 2007).
11
Bakker E, ‘EU Counter-Radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach?’ (2015) 30 Intelligence
and National Security 281 (European Union); Heath-Kelly C, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing
the “Radicalisation” Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy’ (2013) 15 British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 394 (United Kingdom); Huq AZ, ‘The Social Production of National Security’ (2013) 98 Cornell Law
Review 637 (United States and United Kingdom).
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affiliated with terrorism groups. This heterogeneity reflects persisting doubt as to whether there is
a stable phenomenon of ‘radicalization,’ 12 as well as disagreements about how ideological
persuasion is best countered.
Different countries have taken very different approaches to the mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
counterterrorism tools. At one extreme, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were early
adopters of counter-radicalization. Both subsequently experimented with a range of milder
policies. These include theological interventions, counter-messaging, and interventions by
teachers, social workers, and child protective services. 13 In contrast, France did not have a
national counter-radicalization policy until April 2014. Instead, a network of French
counterterrorism institutions, spearheaded by powerful investigating judges working in close
alliance with intelligence agencies, wielded hard power to generate security without much regard
for a need to recognize and negotiate with divergent religious cultures. French notions of
secularism (or laïcité) also preclude overt recognition of racial and religious heterogeneity,
undermining the feasibility of many soft measures. 14 Indeed, France’s 2014 soft counterradicalization plan remains comparatively thin: It includes an experimental program for
reintegration, a national center, a phone line, and a website.15
Domestic political dynamics have also motivated the inclusion of notions of Islam in
counterterrorism policy. In many European countries, right-of-center populist politicians, such as
the Dansk Folkeparti, the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria), and
the Dutch Party for Freedom have coalesced around restrictive immigration measures, aimed at
stanching Muslim migration partly in the name of ensuring security.16 Opposition to immigration
is central to these parties’ appeal.17 In turn, concerns about terrorism motivate anti-immigrant
sentiment.18 The result is a “securitization” of immigration policy that both reflects and reinforces
the political power of the populist right. The end-point of this dynamic is illustrated by the
German writer Hans Monath’s 2010 pronouncement that “Islam is not part of Europe.”19
The Varied and Sundry Uses of Islam
The forces described above have worked powerful changes in the ways security policy
deploys concepts of Islam and the Muslim. I draw on both European and American illustrations to
12

For criticisms of the term ‘radicalization,’ see Neumann PR, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’ (2013) 89
International Affairs 873; Huq AZ, ‘Modeling Terrorist Radicalization’ (2010) 2 Duke Forum for Law and Social
Change 39.
13
Lindekilde L, ‘Value for Money? Problems of Impact Assessment of Counter-Radicalisation Policies on End Target
Groups: The Case of Denmark’ (2012) 18 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 385; Coppock V and
McGovern M, ‘“Dangerous Minds”? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the
“Psychological Vulnerability” of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain’ (2014) 28 Children & Society 242.
14
Hellmuth D, ‘Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way’ (2015) 38 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
979; Foley F, ‘Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France’ (2009) 18
Security Studies 435; Gregory S, ‘France and the War on Terrorism’ (2003) 15 Terrorism and Political Violence 124.
15
Hellmuth (2015), 988.
16
Hafez F, ‘Shifting Borders: Islamophobia as Common Ground for Building Pan-European Right-Wing Unity’ (2014)
48 Patterns of Prejudice 479, 485.
17
Ivarsflaten E, ‘What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization
Models in Seven Successful Cases’ (2008) 41 Comparative Political Studies 3; see also Rydgren J, ‘Immigration
Skeptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries’ (2008) 47 European
Journal of Political Research 737.
18
Zucchino D, ‘I’ve Become a Racist: Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions Over Identity’ New York Times (5
September 2016).
19
Quoted in Alexander JC, ‘Struggling over the Mode of Incorporation: Backlash against Multiculturalism in Europe’
(2013) 36 Ethnic and Racial Studies 531, 544.
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show how religious concepts and criteria can be put to work for security-related ends. The
observed diversity of uses can be broken into three rough categories: Islam as a signal and proxy
for risk, Islam as an object of reform, and Islam as an object of extirpation.
1.

Islam as Signal and Proxy for Risk

Today, outward and visible signifiers of Islamic religiosity—skin pigmentation; use of
Arabic or a language perceived as Middle Eastern or South Asian; beards for men; and veils for
women—still serve as triggers for suspicion and official intervention in a range of contexts.
These signifiers, of course, are imperfect proxies of Muslim identity. In the United States, for
example, a majority of Arab-Americans are Christian. Skin pigmentation and beard length are
necessary imperfect proxies for any faith. More generally, it is a serious mistake to think that all
those raised in Muslim households maintain the same religious beliefs, or even any religious
beliefs at all, into adulthood. Profiling measures that employ a singular and invariant definition of
the Muslim, one that rather parallels the account of the Muslim in doctrinaire Islamic texts’
treatment of apostasy.20
The use of a religious proxy for security risk today, though, appears to result from the
dispersed actions of street-level agents or the general public. 21 The counterterrorism
investigations of the New York Police Department (NYPD) illustrate this trend. From 2002
onward, the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and its Demographics Unit used Islamic identity as a
criterion for long-term electronic and physical surveillance. Confidential informants and
undercover agents targeted mosques, Muslim student associations, and social hubs in Muslimmajority neighborhoods in New York City, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. 22
Undercover officers targeted Muslim university students, trying to extract comments that could
be used as a basis for broad conspiracy charges.23 Despite two legal challenges to these practices,
and a settlement in which the NYPD purported to repudiate religious criteria,24 the Intelligence
Division of the NYPD remains focused on Muslims. An August 2016 audit of that Division’s
activities found that “more than 95% of all files reviewed” concerned Muslim suspects.25
In the United Kingdom, Sections 44(1) and (2) and 45 of the Terrorism Act (2000) allow
police to designate large geographic areas “for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind
which could be used in connection with terrorism.” These provisions derogated from the 1995
Police and Criminal Evidence Act by permitting street stops and searches in the absence of “due
suspicion.”26 In absolute numbers, Section 44 stops were employed more frequently against nonminorities. Ethnic minorities, however, experienced higher rates of stops, and government
ministers warned that such stops would be “inevitably … disproportionately experienced” by
20

Cook D, ‘Apostasy from Islam: A Historical Perspective’ (2006) 31 Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 248.
On the difficulty of regulating street-level bureaucrats, see Hupe P and Hill M, ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public
Accountability’ (2007) 85 Public Administration 279
22
Apuzzo M and Goldman A, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden’s Final Plot
Against America (Touchstone 2013); Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015). Disclosure: I am
counsel for the Hassan plaintiffs.
23
Theoharis J, ‘“I Feel Like a Despised Insect”: Coming of Age Under Surveillance in New York’ (The Intercept)
<https://theintercept.com/2016/02/18/coming-of-age-under-surveillance-in-new-york/> accessed 14 September 2016
24
Apuzzo M and Baker A, ‘New York to Appoint Civilian to Monitor Police’s Counterterrorism Activity’ The New
York Times (7 January 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/nyregion/new-york-to-appoint-monitor-to-reviewpolices-counterterrorism-activity.html> accessed 14 September 2016.
25
Office of the Inspector General-NYPD, ‘An Investigation of NYPD's Compliance with Rules Governing
Investigations of Political Activity’ (23 August 2016) < http://www1.nyc.gov/site/oignypd/reports/reports.page>
accessed 22 September 2016.
26
Hallsworth S, ‘Racial Targeting and Social Control: Looking behind the Police’ (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 293,
296.
21
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British Muslims.27 Ethnographic studies of British Pakistanis have found broad resentment of
counterterrorism powers with particular umbrage directed at Section 44.28
In France, the deployment of emergency powers has been characterized by a similar
distributional pattern. These powers include warrantless home search and ‘assigned residence’
orders (barring a person from leaving a jurisdiction and requiring reports several times daily to a
police station). After terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, French President François
Hollande declared a three-month state of emergency. As of late 2016, the state of emergency has
been renewed three times. A February 2016 report by Amnesty International identified 3,242
searches between November and January and more than 350 assigned residence orders. Almost
all targeted French Muslims, even absent any official religion criterion. Less than one percent of
emergency action resulted in criminal investigation.29 The Amnesty report describes a pervasive
pattern of violent and humiliating treatment during searches.30 It found that in many cases
assigned residence orders appeared to be based on anonymous tips received though the counterradicalization hotline. Relatedly, the official justifications shared with those subject to assigned
residence orders were “usually quite general,” leaving subjects of investigation no way to
challenge their veracity.31 Those searched noted that visible Islamic religiosity seemed to explain
why they, and not neighbors, were subject to emergency powers.
These examples suggest that profiling can persist on the ground, even absent an official
policy, if there is a “widespread tendency to associate Islamic behavior and Muslims generally
with terrorism.”32 Disparate results emerge because widely shared negative beliefs about Muslims
translate into higher rates of suspicion of that class. This background dynamic, moreover, is likely
to be exacerbated by political mobilizations to remove signs of Islamic religiosity from public
life. In Switzerland, for example, a 2009 referendum banned the construction of minarets.33 In
France, Belgium, and some Spanish and Italian towns, there are now bans on religious facial
covering in public.34 Legal prohibitions on legible public manifestations of Islamic identity may
have the effect of suppressing expressions of religiosity35 while also reinforcing the belief that
nonconforming religious displays are repudiations of generally held social norms. As former
French president Nicholas Sarkozy said of the Muslim veil, such manifestations are taken as
“rejection of our values.”36 Hence, when religious identity is expressed in public, it will be more
unusual and more likely to elicit hostile attention.

27

Pantazis C and Pemberton S, ‘From the “Old” to the “New” Suspect Community Examining the Impacts of Recent
UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 646, 656-58; Hallsworth (2004), 297-98.
28
Mythen G, Walklate S and Khan F, ‘‘‘I’m a Muslim, but I’m Not a Terrorist”: Victimization, Risky Identities and the
Performance of Safety’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 736
29
Rubin AJ, ‘Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far’ The New York Times (17 February 2016)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/frances-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-frommuslims.html> accessed 14 September 2016
30
Amnesty International, ‘Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France’s State of Emergency’ (4 February
2016) < https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur21/3364/2016/en/ accessed 14 September 2016.
31
Amnesty International (2016) 20-21.
32
Vertigans S, ‘British Muslims and the UK Government’s “war on Terror” within: Evidence of a Clash of
Civilizations or Emergent de-Civilizing Processes?’ (2010) 61 British Journal of Sociology 26, 33.
33
Göle N, ‘The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets-Mosques Debate’ (2011)
37 Philosophy & Social Criticism 383, 385-86.
34
‘The Islamic Veil across Europe’ BBC News (1 July 2014) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095>
accessed 14 September 2016.
35
But in some cases, stigmatized symbols are adopted precisely because of the negative reaction they invoke. Göle N,
‘The Voluntary Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols’ (2003) 70 Social Research 809.
36
Edmunds J, ‘The “new” Barbarians: Governmentality, Securitization and Islam in Western Europe’ (2011) 6
Contemporary Islam 67.
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2.

Islam as an Object for Reform

Islam has become an object of security-related regulation in the state’s hands as well as a
criterion for surveillance and coercion. This occurs most markedly in counter-radicalization
programs. Religious identity and practice shifts in the counter-radicalization context from a
trigger of state coercion to a mutable object of state regulation. A quintessential exercise in
‘governmentality,’ counter-radicalization treats Islam as a malleable object of state regulation,
and involves the “cultivation of [individual] subjectivity in specific forms.”37 Its aim is not to use
Islam as a proxy for risk, but to transform Islam. Given this new direction, it raises quite new and
distinct concerns in respect to the scope of religious freedom and practice.
The British ‘Prevent’ program provides a vivid example. This national program avowedly
“challeng[es] the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by
helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.”38 A “key measure” of its success,
explained the British government, would be “demonstrable changes in attitudes among
Muslims.”39 It has pursued that change through religious ‘roadshows,’ forums, and advisory
councils, a ‘radicalization’ toolkit for secondary education professionals, and a referral program
for early interventions named “Channel.”40 Prevent also contains some mandates. Secondaryschool teachers, for example, are required to report students’ “radical” behaviour.41 In a single
year (2008-9), £140 million was expended on Prevent with the explicit aim of altering the
substantive content of Islamic beliefs.42
But Prevent has met considerable resistance from Muslim communities, service
providers, and commentators. Teachers, for example, have voted to disobey the “radical”
reporting requirement, while many community organizations have protested or exited
governmental programs.43 Prevent has also been dogged by criticisms that it was meant, in fact, to
work as a covert surveillance program. 44 Such hostility highlights a subtle paradox in the
program’s logic. On the one hand, Prevent’s avowed ambition is reformist. It is a substitute in
that regard for ‘hard’ measures. On the other hand, Prevent treats “Muslims as a security risk”
and as a minority that is “poorly integrated into British society.”45 In this stipulating Muslims as a
categorically problematic minority, Prevent’s negative expressive effect likely works at crosspurposes with its avowed reformist ambition.
Another unintended consequence of Prevent has been a securitization of welfare and
social services. Funding for the Prevent program persisted though the 2008-09 financial crisis, a
period in which direct welfare expenditures were plummeting. As a result, funding-starved social
service providers retooled their proposals to fit a counterterrorism agenda: Welfare policy, and
37

Garland D, ‘“Governmentality” and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology, Sociology’ (1997) 1 Theoretical
Criminology 173, 175.
38
Quoted in Alam Y and Husband C, ‘Islamophobia, Community Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism Policies in Britain’
(2013) 47 Patterns of Prejudice 235, 247.
39
O’Toole T and others, ‘Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim
Engagement’ (2016) 50 Sociology 160, 162.
40
Huq (2013) 654-55; Briggs R, ‘Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom’
(2010) 86 International Affairs 971, 971-72.
41
Gayle D, ‘Prevent Strategy “Could End up Promoting Extremism”’ The Guardian (21 April 2016)
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/21/government-prevent-strategy-promoting-extremism-maina-kiai>
accessed 15 September 2016
42
Briggs (2010) 971.
43
O’Toole and others (2016) 172-74; Gayle (2016).
44
O’Toole and others (2016) 4; Huq (2013), 655-56.
45
O’Toole and others (2016) 165.
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the maintenance of a social safety net, became increasingly entangled with, and evaluated as,
security policy.46 Paradoxically, even as the deployment of Section 44 stop-and-search powers
imposed a new tax on manifest indicia of Muslim identity, the Prevent program made the same
identity status a quasi-prerequisite to the availability of positive, often monetary benefits from the
state.
One way to resolve these paradoxes is to use solely only rather than carrots. This has
been the French way. Between 2001 and 2012, French authorities deported 166 people, including
31 imams, as “Islamists.” 47 Selective deportations of this sort not only influence specific
mosques, but also alter the overall tenor of preaching in French mosques via their deterrent and
expressive effects.
3.

Islam as an Object of Extirpation

There is a third way in which Islam as a religion—a complex of beliefs, practices,
dispositions, and religious tests—has increasingly come to be an object of regulation. This third
category differs from Prevent and other reformist measures because of its ends. The state’s
agenda here is thoroughly negative. Explicitly or not, Islam is construed as a problem to be
eliminated as inconsistent with national or transcendental ‘liberal’ values. The ideological gist of
such policies is crisply conveyed by Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico’s claim that “Islam
has no place in Slovakia” and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s assertion that “Islam was
never part of Europe.”48 No full-scale realization of such sentiments has yet been observed
(although the possibility cannot be ruled out). Nevertheless, the categorical negative force of such
sentiments is echoed in both retail and wholesale security-related policies.
At a retail level, a number of security policies can have the practical effect of
extinguishing religious communal life. Since November 2015, for example, French authorities
have used emergency powers to shut down several mosques and Muslim community
associations.49 These efforts are not without precedent. In 2005, 22 regional units comprising
representatives from police, tax, prefectures, and other regulatory offices were created to fight
“radical Islam.” These units closed mosques, Halal butchers, and small retail establishments.50 In
the United States at roughly the same time, several nationwide Islamic charities had assets frozen
and officers prosecuted.51 Asset-freezing orders, criminal investigations, and prosecutions (even
when unsuccessful) effectively dismantled much of the nationwide civil society that American
Muslims had constructed until then.
More subtly, these policies can be understood as evidence of a belief that Muslims as a
group are not, or cannot become, full citizens. Consider in this regard the revocation of
citizenship measures either proposed or used in Europe. In France, President Hollande proposed a
46
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statutory mechanism for déchéance de nationalité (citizenship stripping) in December 2015
targeting dual nationals alone. The French Senate rejected the measure, but Hollande’s proposal
was widely understood as targeted at French Muslims alone, and to have implied their second-tier
status as citizens whose loyalty is presumptively in question.52
At a more macro level, the extirpation of Islam is advanced though immigration and
citizenship policies. In the United States, several Republican presidential candidates have called
for categorical bars on Muslim immigration. In Europe, populist parties call for bans of a similar
character. Some European nations have substantially reduced the permitted flow of lawful
migrants under political pressure. One means for both slowing migrant flows, and also altering
the composition of migrant flows, is the use of citizenship tests that screen based on culture or
familiarity with local customs. These have been used in several European countries, including
Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands with the more-or-less explicit aim of ending Muslim
immigration.
The connection between security and migration is commonly rendered explicit on the
face of such tests. In 2006, Heribert Rech, the interior minister of Baden-Württemberg, proposed
thirty additional questions to be used on the citizenship test administered in that region. Questions
expressly focused on terrorism in addition to a focus on cultural norms. So obvious was its
bottom-line intent that Baden-Württemberg’s test was quickly dubbed “the Muslim test.”53 In the
Netherlands, the content of the recently revised citizenship test focused on values of sexual
freedom, gender equality, freedom of speech and individuality—assumed to be inconsistent with
Islam.54 The effect of such tests falls disproportionately on citizens invoking a right to family
reunification, as opposed to high-skills migrants.55 In Denmark, the citizenship test eschews such
raw generalizations. Yet, the Danish test has been recently reformed to make it almost impossible
to overcome even for native Danes. This led to 68.8% failure rates for new migrants.56 Introduced
at a moment at which migration flows were starting to be dominated by Muslims, the timing of
this change seems to reflect a deeper belief: that it is current migrants that are the problem.
*

*

*

Islam and the Muslim, then, are concepts with plural usages in the policy space of
national security. Their use as criteria of suspicion is only part of the picture. In addition, Islam
operates as a subject to be regulated and object of governmentality. The state can also aim at
more categorical exclusions and prohibitions of Islam. The gap between liberal aspirations to
equality and extensive personal liberty, and thoroughly illiberal forms of racial and religious
discrimination, in short, is neither wide nor hard to navigate.
The (New) Critique of Counterterrorism Policy’s Uses of Islam
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Concepts of Islam and the Muslim are exploited in many different ways across the
regulatory apparatus of counterterrorism and related policies. The heterogeneity of Islam’s uses
suggests a need both to rethink old critiques and to develop new forms of criticism.
1.

The Limits of the Old Critiques

In the international human rights context, as well as within many domestic law frames, a
central question is the rationality of official distinctions drawn in religious terms. The focus in
international human rights law is commonly on “the existence of an objective and reasonable
justification for … differential treatment” and the “existence of a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the difference in treatment and the legitimate aim sought to be
realized.”57
An assessment of the rationality of discriminatory criteria remains necessary to a
comprehensive normative critique of counterterrorism policy.. But it is no longer sufficient.
Consider as an example Bernard Harcourt’s powerful argument against religious profiling.
Harcourt pointed out that the value of faith as a signal of risk depended on the relative responses
to such policing by both profiled and nonprofiled classes. Harcourt pointed out (with more
sophistication and clarity than I can muster here) that if the profiled group reduces its activity,
while the non-profiled group ramps it up, the profile no longer works.58 Although powerful,
Harcourt’s critique does not necessarily illuminate contemporary profiling. The deployments of
“Muslim” or “Islamic” as criteria for state coercion today no longer follow from a rational,
centralized determination that such criteria are needful. Instead, they emerge as an emergent
quality of the individual preferences and beliefs of dispersed, unconnected officials (or members
of the public.) Those dispersed ‘street level’ actors are not making a cost-benefit judgment about
the epistemic value of religious traits. Rather, they are acting on intuition, half-formed belief, and
spontaneous emotional coloration. Absent a centralized state making rational decisions,
arguments for critique and reform should not focus on the internal logic of profiling. Rather, they
must speak directly to the stereotypes and fears, .
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2.

New Paths for Critical Inquiry

Viewed in the round, the concept of Islam in counterterrorism today performs a number
of functions unrelated to the efficient allocation of security resources. Accounting for this broader
array of uses of Islam in the service of counterterrorism should elicit new inquiries into the
aggregate impact and political economy of counterterrorism and related fields. I offer, in
concluding, a sketch of some of these lines of critique.
First, an analysis of security policy is useful situated in the larger context of public
debates on Muslim migration and public symbols of Islam. These debates suggest that officials
and members of the public juxtapose the moral legitimacy of the liberal state with the perceived
normative bankruptcy of Islam.59 Muslims are simultaneously figured as incapable of respecting
basic norms of dress and civility, and also of discarding basic rules of moral conduct. The claim
that Islam “has no place” in Europe is thus based on parallel concerns about culture and security.
It seems likely that those parallel concerns are mutually reinforcing. Both imply that Muslims are
incapable of coexisting peacefully with non-Muslim neighbors. In this fashion, debates about
national culture and national security may be mutually constitutive, and mutually reinforcing.
One implication of this analysis may be that debates about highly visible symbols of
Islam, such as the veil or the minaret, are counterproductive for advocates of nondiscrimination
and Muslim human rights. These debates condense the relationship of Muslim minorities to nonMuslim majorities into singular points of highly charged contestation that are resistant to
compromise. Such debates obscure the fact that Muslim minority communities and their
neighbors in fact engage routinely in negotiation and reach compromise over many issues.
Indeed, such negotiated coexistence is the dominant local experience in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. 60 The tendency to highlight symbolic conflicts, while ignoring local and
pragmatic intercultural relations, renders the putative tensions between Islam and liberalism as
sharper, and less amenable to compromise, than they really are. As a result, they may push
participants toward more extreme solutions in the security domain and elsewhere.
Second, my analysis of Islam’s varied role in security policy suggests a need to account
for distributive effects, and in particular how the costs of security are apportioned between
marginal and mainstream groups across society. The profiling, reformist efforts, and prohibitory
policies described above all have the likely effect of exacerbating existing forms of economic and
social exclusion. The result may, paradoxically, be less security rather than more.
France provides a useful example of this dynamic. Recent research by Claire Adida,
David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort uses sophisticated causal inference methods to isolate the
effect of Islamic or Muslim identities on the labor market and economic behavior of French
nationals more generally. They provide robust evidence of substantial discrimination on the basis
of perceived religious identity in the context of face-to-face interactions and arms-length
economic transactions.61 President Hollande’s recent deployment of emergency powers has likely
exacerbated French Muslims’ economic marginalization and social subordination by validating
the beliefs that animate such discrimination. The implicit expressive effect of profiling under
Section 44 and the Prevent program likely have the same consequence. Hence, the securitization
59
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of Islam not only provides a substitute for discussion of the limits of practiced liberalism, but also
deepens the exclusionary elements of the liberal economic order.
Economic and social marginalization further erodes security. Empirical studies in the
United States and Britain show that policing perceived as biased against Muslims undermines
both Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ willingness to cooperate with police.62 At the same time, a
growing body of robust evidence suggests that countries experiencing minority group economic
discrimination are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorism attacks.63 If there is
a strong correlation between minority economic exclusion and domestic terrorism, security
policies that exacerbate such exclusion, or retrench negative stereotypes of Muslims, will have
perverse and adverse effects on terrorism risk. Because politicians can profit from the cultivation
of anti-Muslim sentiments, though, these negative spillovers are unlikely to be accounted for in
policy-making.
Finally, the question of Islam and Muslims in the counterterrorism context is usefully
viewed not merely as a matter of individual rights, but also as an issue of distributive justice. In
the past decade and a half, the costs of the security state’s expansion have not fallen evenly across
social groups. The increasingly flexible role of Islam across a number of specific policy areas, the
costs of such policies fall in predictably asymmetrical, and highly regressive, patterns. To be sure,
programs such as Prevent have had the inadvertent and temporary effect of channeling state funds
to Muslim-identified groups. By and large, though, the costs of security are borne by Muslims, in
the forms of concentrated stigma, economic exclusion, fear of private violence, and barriers to
familial reunification. In France and other European countries, Muslims tend toward the more
impoverished end of the income and wealth scale.
Security against terrorism is a public good that all enjoy. It is unjust for the costs of its
production to be concentrated on one minority group. This would be so even if there were good
efficiency reasons for that concentration. But there are not. Profiling and selective coercion are
measures of dubious worth. Extirpation is based on false and pernicious stereotyping of the gap
between Islam and ‘Western’ culture. Reformist efforts raise the important question of how much
the state can legitimately shape confessional practice. These questions must be considered in light
of the fact that Muslim citizens have, if anything, a special contribution to make in terms of the
kinds of arguments and social mobilization they can (and do) bring to bear against IS’s and
al Qaeda’s propaganda.64 How this contribution can be recognized and cultivated, while ensuring
that the burdens of security are equitably distributed—this in my view is the central challenge of
contemporary counterterrorism, a challenge that sounds as much in distributive justice terms as it
does in the values captured by individual rights.
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Conclusion
The dynamics mapped in this chapter will likely deepen in the near term as right-ofcenter populists in Europe and the United States exercise a greater measure of political influence.
To date, judicial review and administrative mechanisms alike have failed to provide much
traction against the rights-related and distributive inequities of security policy. Nevertheless,

domestic Muslim civil-society organizations are increasingly vocal in their resistance to
the myriad uses of Islam for security ends.65 This chapter has described the challenge they
face. Alas, it is a challenge that will not be surmounted quickly, or without great cost on the part
of European and American Muslims.
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